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VOLUME 19 FEBRUARY 1974 NUMBER 3
OVERPAYMENTS IN SUPPLIER PROMOTIONAL
PROGRAMS: THE FTC SOLUTION*
ELIOT G. DISNERt
I. INTRODUCTION
O N AUGUST 4, 1972, the Federal Trade Commission (Commis-
sion) revised the Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other
Merchandising Payments and Services (Guides or amended Guides),'
which interpret sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act
(Act). 2 Section 2(d), in order to eliminate the opportunity for unfair-
ness and disguised price discrimination which might otherwise exist, re-
* The views herein expressed are only those of a member of the Federal Trade
Commission Staff. They do not purport to be and are not to be construed as repre-
sentative of Federal Trade Commission policy.
t Member of the Michigan Bar; Attorney for the Bureau of Competition,
Federal Trade Commission. B.A., University of Michigan, 1969; J.D., Harvard
University, 1972.
1. Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and
Services, 16 C.F.R. §§ 240.1-.17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Guides].
These Guides supplanted the 1969 Guides, 34 Fed. Reg. 8285 (1969), also
known as the Fred Meyer Guides, after the case which prompted their promulgation.
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968). That decision required suppliers
who made promotional payments available to direct buyers to make them available on
comparable terms to indirect buyers (through wholesalers, etc.) with whom the direct
buyers were in competition. Id. at 358. The 1969 Guides expanded the previous
1960 Guides to allow practical implementation of this decision. 34 Fed. Reg. 8285
(1969). The present article involves changes made unrelated to the Meyer case or
the problem with which it dealt.
2. Section 2(d) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract
for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such
person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or com-
modities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such pay-
ment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1970).
Section 2(e) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser
against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with
or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing
to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing,
(397)
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quires that suppliers make promotional allowances available to buyers
on "proportionally equal terms." The Guides were promulgated to
indicate a course of conduct that would avoid the risk of law violation
and possible Commission prosecution.3
The type of promotional allowance under consideration is that
given by manufacturers to their customers subject to the performance
of specified promotional activities. For a given allowance, such cus-
tomer activities might include advertising in local newspapers, setting
up store displays, and maintaining adequate supplies - all for the
benefit of the manufacturer's product. Frequently the allowance is
offered on a volume basis, as a per case discount, with the amount of
discount predicated upon the service to be performed.4
The draftsmen of the amended Guides recognized that when all
buyers obtain the same allowance for the same promotion from their
common supplier, larger buyers, who have the ability to indulge in
some promotions at a lower cost, might receive excess funds.5 They
further recognized that some buyers received considerably greater allow-
ances than other buyers for performing the same task, irrespective of
cost savings.' The drafters have attempted to eliminate any such ex-
cesses by, inter alia, inserting the phrase "cost or approximate cost"
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms
not accorded to all purchasers on proportionately equal terms.
Id. § 13(e).
Since only section 2(d) concerns promotional allowances, this article will deal
solely with that subsection.
3. See 34 Fed. Reg. 8385 (1969). It should be noted at this point that the
Commission Guides do not have the force of law, but rather are suggestive of methods
of doing business which will avoid the risk of Commission prosecution. Thus, they
are an expression of what the Commission thinks the law is:
Industry guides are administrative interpretations of laws administered by
the Commission for the guidance of the public in conducting its affairs in con-
formity with legal requirements. They provide the basis for voluntary and
simultaneous abandonment of unlawful practices by members of industry. Failure
to comply with the guide may result in corrective action by the Commission under
applicable statutory provisions. Guides may relate to a practice common to many
industries or to specific practices of a particular industry.
16 C.F.R. § 17.1(a) (1973). But see Alterman Foods, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 298 (1973),
wherein the Commission de-emphasized a specific example in the Guides to find the
respondent in violation of section 2(d) through section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). 82 F.T.C. at 340-41.
4. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 189 (1955). See also Millstein, Cooperative Advertising, 7 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 873, 894-96 (1962). The discount serves, in essence, as a fund from
which promotional expenses are drawn. The "fund" is not necessarily intended to
cover all anticipated promotions.
5. For example, a high-volume advertising grocery chain may receive prefer-
ential rates from the local newspaper over its single store counterpart for comparable
advertising. See Guide 7, example 7.
6. For example, a typical plan under the old reading would be to allow a 10c
per case discount for any customer who places a 3-inch ad in the local newspaper.
The overpayment is clear when it is considered that a 50-store chain could comply
with the requirement at the same or lower cost as its single-store counterpart, yet be
vastly overpaid due to its greater purchases.
[VOL. 19 : p. 397
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wherever the phrase "cost or value" had appeared in the 1969 Guides.'
For example, the Guides now provide that:
Allowances that have little or no relationship to cost or
approximate cost of the service provided by the retailer may be
considered to be in violation of section 2(d) or subject to the
prohibitions of section 2(a) of the amended Clayton Act .... 8
Previously, suppliers argued that if they compensated all custo-
mers who complied with their promotional programs on "proportion-
ally equal terms" from their own perspective, they were within the
law. This was because the value of the promotion to the supplier
would not vary with the economies or buying power of his customer.
Further, larger payments to larger buyers could be justified because
those buyers accounted for more sales of the supplier's product, and
thus large buyer promotions were of greater value to the supplier.
The "proportionally equal" method of compensation probably made
the supplier's bookkeeping simple because only one formula for pay-
ments had to be maintained. In addition, it limited the supplier's need
to investigate to ascertain if the allowances were properly used."
However, this method also permitted the supplier to favor indirectly
and/or inadvertently his larger purchasers, whose economies or lever-
age with local media sellers allowed them to perform the promotions
more cheaply -than could his smaller buyers or whose higher purchases
allowed them greater excesses. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, by its own broad terms, was designed to prevent direct price
discrimination exercised in favor of (large) buyers.'0 However, such
apparent discrimination could continue to exist because suppliers and
their counsel construed "value," as used in the Guide's interpretation
of the narrower section 2(d), to mean value to them. Thus, some
large buyers had the capacity to benefit from the allowance, irrespec-
tive of, and in addition to, benefiting from the promotion itself.
The 1972 Amendments evidence the Commission's conclusion
that minimizing excess payments to some buyers is of greater import-
ance than preserving to sellers the right to an administratively simpler
promotional program which happened to provide excess funds to one
buyer but not to another. The Commission clearly viewed the opera-
7. Guide 9 n.2 and Guide 11 were so modified. See 37 Fed. Reg. 15,700 (1972).
Guide 7, example 7, which attempts to rectify the situation described in note 5 supra,
demonstrates the impact of this alteration.
8. Guide 9 n.2. Another change ends the supplier's exposure to liability if he has
taken reasonable steps to verify that the buyer has complied with other sections of the
Guides, even though the buyer "has retained an allowance in excess of the cost or
approximate cost, if the actual cost is not known, of services performed ... "
Guide 11 (b).
9. See 34 Fed. Reg. 8288 (1969).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
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tion of such programs from the small buyer's perspective in order to
give meaning to proportional equality."
On April 12, 1973, a paper delivered at the ABA Antitrust
Section Spring Meeting characterized this and other revisions in the
amended Guides as "stiff, commercially unrealistic and . ..adminis-
trative overkill.' 12  It also condemned the revisions for extending
the prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act beyond existing prece-
dent.'3 While this position may not be without merit as to workability,
it did not fairly address the supportable legal and philosophical bases
for the amended Guides' implementation. This article will attempt
to make the case for the "cost or approximate cost" approach to assess-
ing advertising allowances and other merchandising payments and
services.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
While no one will dispute the cloudy history of the Robinson-
Patman Act, at least this much is uncontroverted: -the Act was in-
tended to curb the power of giant purchasers to receive preferential
prices from manufacturers and, at the same time, to protect the smaller
purchasers who lacked that buying power.'4 As if a general prohibi-
tion of discriminatory practices were not enough, the framers antici-
11. As a direct consequence of the amended Guides, the Commission, on October
25, 1973, countermanded 12 advisory opinions which had been issued between 1966
and 1971. 38 Fed. Reg. 28270, 28272, 28273, 28277 (1973).
The Commission had embraced this viewpoint before 1968, as indicated by
the 1960 Guides, predecessor to the 1969 amendments, which stated inter alia:
A seller may not properly pay nor may a customer properly receive and
retain any amount in excess of that actually used by the customer to perform
the service.
Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services:
Compliance with Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act (May 19, 1960). For the full text of the 1960 Guides,
See E. W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 258-63 (1964 ed.). For a discussion
of the 1960 Guides, see generally Comment, Recent Problems Under Section 2(d) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 160 (1961).
12. Applebaum, Promotional Allowances and the Fred Meyer Guides, 42 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 355-56 (1973).
13. Id. at 363.
14. This is amply demonstrated by the following passage extracted from the
House floor debate made by the bill's co-sponsor, Representative Wright Patman:
What are the objectives of this bill? Mr. Chairman, there has grown up in
this country a policy in business that a few rich, powerful organizations by reason
of their size and their ability to coerce and intimidate manufacturers have forced
those manufacturers to give them their goods at a lower price than they give
to the independent merchants under the same and similar circumstances and for
the same quantities of goods. Is that right or wrong? It is wrong.
80 CONG. REC. 8111 (1936). The draftsman of the bill, H.B. Teegarden, also shed
some light on the bill's direction.
[The Seller] must not ...be permitted to bleed part of his customers for
the benefit of the others, and if any of his customers have the power to compel
him to do so, that power constitutes the evil against which this bill is directed.
Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm. To Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 10, at 31 (1935). 4
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pated some of the devices sellers and buyers might use to avoid the
law and attempted to block those escape routes. One such attempt
produced section 2(d), forbidding "pseudo-advertising allowances,"
which was intended to be enforced on a per se basis, as opposed to its
progenitor, section 2(a), which required a showing of anti-competi-
tive effect. 15
Despite the strict prohibitions of section 2(d), its standard for
specific enforcement was left "provocatively vague."' 6  Prior to its
passage, Congressman Utterback, Chairman of the House Conferees,
stated on the House floor in reference to section 2(d) :
The existing evil at which this part of the bill is aimed is . . .
the grant of discriminations under the guise of payments for
advertising and promotional services which, whether or not the
services are actually rendered as agreed, results in an advantage
to the customer so favored as compared with others who have to
bear the cost of such services themselves. The prohibitions of the
bill, however, are made intentionally broader than this one sphere,
in order to prevent evasion in resort to others by which the same
purpose might be accomplished ... .17
Frederick Rowe concluded in his outline of the legislative history of
the Act that the House Judiciary Committee condemned, inter alia,
payments made by manufacturers to a buyer which were "greatly in
excess of his actual services."'" This statement is itself "provocatively
vague," leaving unanswered the question of in whose eyes these
"'services" are to be measured.
To demonstrate the confusion, one need only juxtapose the report
of the Senate Judiciary Committee chaired by Senator Logan with his
subsequent remarks made on the floor of the Senate. The report stated:
[A]n allowance becomes unjust when the service is . . . ren-
dered . . . and . . . the payment is grossly in excess of its value
19
Later, the Senator stated:
Legitimate allowances for advertising and matters of that nature
may be made, but allowances must not be made for the purpose
of giving the purchaser an opportunity to buy goods at a lower
price than others similarly situated may buy them.20
15. W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUrDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 129 (1963).
See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959).
16. F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBiNSON-PATMAN ACT 370-
72 (1962).
17. 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936).
18. F. RowE, supra note 16, at 369.
19. S. REp. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
20. 80 CONG. REc. 6282 (1936) (emphasis added).
FEBRUARY 1974]
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Reasoning from the latter statement leads to the conclusion that given
the requisite "purpose," any advertising allowance which exceeds the
advertising cost, provides an excess which, in fact, reduces the price
of the goods. The first passage, on the other hand, evidences an intent
to measure excess allowances in terms of value.2 It is doubtful that
this confusion is by design. The history of the Act is silent regard-
ing the difference between cost and value, the nature of quantity
promotional discounts, or the ability of larger buyers to secure prefer 7
ential advertising rates.22
To obtain any guidance from the history then, the analysis should
be moved back one step to look at the general, rather than specific,
goals of the section. Since there is lingering doubt that value to the
seller was the desired measure, it is helpful to ascertain whether this
provision was aimed at preventing discrimination against smaller
buyers or at preventing larger buyers from extracting unreasonable
allowances from helpless sellers.23 If it were directed more towards
helping the former, then the appropriate measure must be one which
sets a ceiling on allowances to (large) buyers and allows them no
post-promotional surplus, i.e., a cost measure. If section 2(d) were
21. A more stark conflict in the legislative history is demonstrated by the
following passages. First:
Where . . . a manufacturer grants to a particular chain distributor an adver-
tising allowance of a stated amount per month per store in which the former's
goods are sold, a competing customer with a smaller number of stores, but equally
able to furnish the same service per store, and under conditions of the same value
to the seller, would be entitled to a similar allowance on that basis.
Second:
Such an allowance becomes unjust when the service is not rendered as agreed
and paid for, or when, if rendered, the payment is grossly in excess of its value,
or when in any case the customer is deriving from it equal benefit to his own
business and is thus enabled to shift to his vendor substantial portions of his own
advertising cost, while his smaller competitor, unable to command such allow-
ances, cannot do so.
H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936) (emphasis added). The former
statement supports the position that value to the seller should be the standard, while
the latter would reject that standard where competing buyers could not both benefit
by the allowance. This accepts the buyer's point of view, wherein any payment over
the costs of one buyer favors him, vis-A-vis, the buyer with higher costs, or here
pointedly where one buyer can accept the promotion and another cannot. This argu-
ably goes beyond the question of mere availability.
22. Perhaps the fact of unequal advertising rates was not apparent in the 1930's,
and thus the matter of overpayments was also not apparent. One commentator
has stated :
The statute employs a confusing combination of interrelated sections to regulate
a method of doing business - mass merchandising - that was only vaguely
understood at the time the bill was enacted.
E. KINTER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 14 (1970).
23. The specific proponents of the "value" standard, whose interest is apparently
in not reducing the outlay of promotional allowances, are by no means "helpless."
For example, one of the most active forces favoring the retention of the "value"
approach was the Grocery Manufacturers of America, an association whose Board
of Directors include the Chairmen of Coca-Cola, Bristol-Myers, Kellogg, and Colgate-
Palmolive. See Letter from Grocery Manufacturers of America to Ernest G. Barnes
(GMA Letter), June 30, 1971, regarding Proposed Amendments to the Guides for
Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services (copy on
file at the Villanova Law Review).
[VOL. 19: p. 397
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directed towards the latter objective, then the standard used should
set a ceiling on the amounts sellers would be compelled to pay and
thus prevent powerful buyers from securing more than the promo-
tion's worth to the seller.
While by no means clearly resolving this dilemma, a thorough
reading of the history of the Act is persuasive that the primary purpose
of section 2(d) is the protection of small competitor buyers. Con-
gressman Patman's statement made in the House debate best demon-
strates this conclusion:
One great concern in America last year compelled manu-
facturers to pay it $8,000,000 in pseudo-advertising allowances
and pseudo-brokerage charges. That amount of benefits the in-
dependent merchants of the country were not entitled to receive
from the same manufacturers, purchasing the same quantity under
the same conditions. You [Mr. Chairman] are in favor of giving
the citizens the same right as the corporations in this country,
and that is all that we 'are asking in this bill. 4
Even if this position be doubted, but it be conceded that small
competitor protection was a primary purpose of section 2(d), then the
sought-for interpretation would still protect sellers, and the protection
of sellers' interests must constitute the only other possible "primary"
purpose of that section. If the seller can pay no more to the buyer
than the cost of the service to the buyer, then unreasonable allowances
could not be exacted from the seller. Thus, both legislative motives
would be fulfilled. It is enough to say, then, that a primary purpose
of the Act was to end small buyer discrimination, a position which
can be easily defended. 5 The present interpretation fulfills both legis-
lative motives by protecting both purposes, whereas a reading which
allows the seller to decide "value" protects but one. 6
24. 80 CONG, Rxc. 8111 (1936) (emphasis added). This expands on a similar
remark made the year earlier in the House committee hearings by Representative
Patman: "This bill is asking you to give the independents the same rights and benefits
as the chains." Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm. to Amend the Clayton
Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 10, at 14 (1935).
25. Cf. Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm. to Amend the Clayton
Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 10 (1935), wherein H.B. Teegarden, the section's
draftsman and representative for the United States Wholesale Grocers' Association,
noted that "buying power is the source of the evil. The seller is merely an innocent
victim." Id. at 31. This might suggest that the bill was designed primarily to aid
sellers. Yet, only a few lines down the page, Teegarden noted that the thrust of the
bill is to "prohibit discrimination between customers generally." Id. See E. W.
KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 60-61 (2d ed. 1973).
26. The Supreme Court has stated generally that:
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices
by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by
virtue of their greater purchasing power.
FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960); accord, FTC v. Fred Meyer,
Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1968). See C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATIOM
LAW 157 n.7 (1959).
FEBRUARY 1974]
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III. CASE LAW AND OTHER PRECEDENT
The cases in this area are not alien to the adoption of the "cost"
limit. Where use of the word and concept "value" is found, it is seem-
ingly based less on a response to a felt need to consider the seller's
interest than on an inability to flatly apply the "cost" alternative to
promotional functions incapable of precise measure. Where measur-
able promotional activities have been involved, the courts have not
missed the opportunity to advocate the stricter cost standard.
In R.H. Macy v. FTC,2 7 the respondent exacted from selected
sellers $1000 each to finance its 100th anniversary promotion. None
of the money was used directly to promote the seller's products.
28
Presented with no measurement difficulties, the Second Circuit stated:
[O]ne of the evils that Congress made clear that it was con-
demning under Section 2(d) was an advertising or promotional
allowance exacted by a large buyer to achieve indirect price dis-
criminations, either through shifting the buyer's advertising costs
to his vendors, or through simply pocketing the difference be-
tween an inflated allowance and that amount actually spent to
advertise or promote the vendor's product.29
The buyer in Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC,"0 persuaded
the respondent seller to contribute to its anniversary promotion. The
buyer's promotion included newspaper advertising, displays, and "per-
sonal enthusiasm." However, the buyer's schedule, from which Vanity
Fair selected a promotional option, was geared directly to the circula-
tion and size of any newspaper advertisements placed.8' Although the
case directly concerned the limited availability of the promotion, the
Second Circuit noted interstitially that the offending respondent's
"policy did not require it to pay a uniform proportion of the cost but
only 'an amount reasonably related' thereto, '8 2 and that the benefit to
the seller was not sufficient to determine the legitimacy of the program.3
27. 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964).
28. Id. at 446. This fact alone required some progressive interpretation to place
the practice in the ambit of section 2(d), rather than section 2(a) of the Act.
29. 326 F.2d at 448 (emphasis added).
30. 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. Id. at 483. This was undoubtedly measured by the standard rates for such
advertisements.
32. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 486--87. The court did suggest that some varying benefits to the seller
might mitigate the circumstances of the discrimination between competitor buyers,
but refused to consider and measure any such variations. Thus, it advanced to the
determination that the payment of allowances in amounts widely varying from "a
uniform proportion of the [promotional] cost" borne by each competitor constituted
a violation. Id.
[VOL. 19 : p. 397404
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1974], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss3/1
PROMOTIONAL PROGRAMS
In the Ninth Circuit's treatment of Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC,4
the payment of promotional allowances in excess of promotional costs
was a signficant issue.8 5 Fred Meyer, a grocery chain, solicited $350
each from many of its suppliers in payment for pages in a promo-
tional coupon booklet. The payment approximated the proper share
of the booklet's cost for each supplier.3 6 Some suppliers furthered the
promotion by giving additional volume reductions, and by redeeming
customer discount coupons from the booklet. The court held that
the excesses paid over the cost of the provided services constituted a
violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. While the
court did not hew tightly to the line of the cost of services rendered
approach, 7 its proscription of some promotional payments which were
probably correlated with the value of services received by the supplier
is indicative of its adoption of this perspective."8 Specifically, dis-
counts given that related to the higher volume of sales generated by
the booklet promotion were to some extent a measure of the value
of the promotion to the seller, and were voided by the court.8 9
Two cases, often relied upon to denote putative court or Com-
mission acceptance of the value standard, manifest the difficulties in
the calculation of promotional expense and the nonexistence of cost
evidence at the Commission level.4" In Lever Brothers Co.,41 one of
the so-called Soap Cases,42 some of the promotional allowances offered
at the small business side of the marketing spectrum were, at best,
imprecisely measurable. For example, the price of handbills, in-store
34. 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd in part, 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
35. Id. at 362. The Supreme Court did not review the lower court's finding on
this issue. 390 U.S. at 344 n.3.
36. 359 F.2d at 355-56.
37. The court stated in part:
[W]hile , . . services rendered need not be shown precisely to equal promotional
payments received .... the relationship between payments received and promo-
tional services rendered cannot be unreasonable ....
Id. at 362.
38. The court concluded there was a violation of section 2(a), "[i]n view of
such substantial disparities between receipts and proved allocable expenses .... Id.
(emphasis added). It would appear that this is merely another way of saying cost.
39. Id. The greater the amount of the suppliers' products that was sold, the
greater the value of the promotions must necessarily have been to them.
The court's analysis is admittedly vitiated in part by its failure to charac-
terize the repayment as a violation of section 2(d) proper. See note 38 supra. The
court stated that there was "some support" for such a finding, but concluded that it
was "not necessary" to make it, in light of the obvious existence of the overpayment,
which allowed a direct finding of a section 2(a) violation. Id. Cf. American Cooper-
ative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 913 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 721 (1946) (payment in excess of advertising cost is a violation of
section 2(a)).
40. Giant Food, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 977 (1961), aff'd as modified, 307 F.2d 184
(D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963) ; Lever Brothers Co., 50 F.T.C.
494 (1953).
41. 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953).
42. The other two Soap Cases, Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 50 F.T.C.
513 (1953), and Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 50 F.T.C. 523 (1953), presented the
same issues and were decided the same day as the Lever Brothers case.
FEBRUARY 1974]
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displays, and feature sales could have been difficult and cumbersome
for some merchants to calculate under the "cost" alternative. Thus,
the Commission appeared to adopt the "value to the supplier" standard.4"
However, the Commission specifically found that a hearing examiner's
ruling, which forbade the introduction of evidence on the relationship
between the costs of the services and the allowances given, was "too
restrictive."44  The failure of complaint counsel to make a record
for appeal, however, was held to waive any error.4 ' It is not clear
what effect such cost evidence would have had if the Commission had
been exposed to it. If the "value to the seller" theory were truly accepted,
it would have eclipsed any need to prove costs at all in that case, as
the issue involved the fairness of varying payments to different com-
peting customers. If the acceptable standard of fairness was deter-
mined from the seller's viewpoint, the customer's costs should have
been irrelevant. This inconsistency in Lever Brothers and the other
Soap Cases underscores the difficulties the Commission was having
with the "cost or value" interpretation in general.46
In the second case, Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 7 the services per-
formed, which the Commission attempted to relate to allowances
paid,4" were incapable of valuation and, therefore, the aspect of the
complaint relating to overpayment was dismissed.4" The case involved
allowances which were paid for media advertising, the costs of which
43. 50 F.T.C. at 511-12.
44. Id. at 511.
45. Id.
46. The Commission also stated:
Section 2(d) permits payments for services or facilities actually furnished.
Certainly, payments for services or facilities not furnished are not authorized.
The same would be true of payments grossly in excess of the cost or value of
the services rendered.
Id. (emphasis added). Syntactically, the first two sentences stand as distinguished
from the third by use of the words: "The same would be true . . ." Therefore, that
third sentence either supports or rebuts those preceeding; it does not modify them.
In this context, it is likely that the sentence is meant as support. Yet, the sentences
espouse two different standards. One would find a violation in effect, where payment
exceeded various furnished elements; the other would find a violation where cost or
value was "grossly" exceeded. Thus, assuming "value" is equal to "services of facili-
ties . . . furnished," two different lines are drawn to determine the violation -
one at value, the other well above it. Even though both lines are beyond the cost
standard, the fact of this obvious inconsistency must stand as testimony to the failure
of the Commission to truly come to grips with the rule in 1953.
47. 58 F.T.C. 977 (1961), aff'd as modified, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963).
48. The second count of the complaint specifically charged that the respondent:
[Flailed to expend the entire amount of money received from each supplier for
advertising to be done in promoting his products and diverted substantial amounts
of such payments to its own use.
Id. at 1005. The case was brought against the buyer, Giant Food, Inc., under section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), although the under-
lying policy was derived from section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 58 F.T.C.
at 1005-10.
49. 58 F.T.C. at 1010. To be precise, the count was dismissed because of a
"failure of proof." Id.
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were calculable, and allowances which were paid for "in-store promo-
tion" and "supervisory services for assuring prominent display of the
suppliers' wares," the costs of which were not calculable. ° Since the
Commission conceded the absence of information which would allow
complete valuation, its espousal of a value to the seller approach,
while admittedly unhelpful to the instant thesis, was not relied upon
and was, therefore, empty as a holding.
In two other cases, the seller's value standard was embraced but
little support for the position can be derived therefrom."' In General
Foods Corporation,52 the respondent, in an effort to boost its lunch
wagon business, gave price discounts to proprietors in exchange for
their agreement to perform numerous promotional and quasi-promo-
tional duties.5 The Commission dismissed the section 2(d) count
since all services were not likely to have been performed by all the
merchants, although payments nevertheless were made to them, and
because some of the services could not be valued. 4 The opinion con-
tains an apparent contradiction 55 in that the clear cost test of rules
promulgated for another industry was juxtaposed with, and given
as support for, the proposition that there must be a relationship be-
tween the allowance and "cost or reasonable value. '" 6 The Commis-
sion further stated that each type of service, to fall within section
2(d), "must be capable of having a price or value tag put on it." 57 If
these statements are to be reconciled, one would have to presume that
perhaps the Commission has not perceived any difference between
50. Id. at 1009-10. Further, the contracts for allowances were either vague or
silent as to how monies earmarked for normally well-defined advertising activities
were to be spent. Id. at 1008.
51. American News v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824
(1962) ; General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
52. 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
53. These duties included: maintaining adequate stocks, offering services offered
by competitors, and arranging for display of products and promotional material.
Id. at 819-20.
54. Id. at 823. In other words, the payments were not true promotional allowances.
55. The only way to avoid this contradiction would be to read "value" as mean-
ing value to the buyer.
56. Specifically, the Commission stated:
The same thought was expressly in the rules promulgated for the Corset, Brassiere
and Allied Products Industry:"Note 1: Industry members giving advertising allowances to competing custo-
mers must exercise precaution and diligence in seeing that all of such allowances
are used in accordance with the terms of their offers.
Note 2: When an industry member gives allowances to competing customers
for advertising in a newspaper or periodical, the fact that a lower advertising rate
for an equivalent space is available to one or more, but not all, such customers, is
not to be regarded by the industry member as warranting the retention by such
customer or customers of any portion of the allowance for his or their personal
use or benefit."
There must be a discernible relationship between the amounts paid and the
cost or reasonable value of the services rendered. In other words, each type of
service must be capable of having a price or value tag put on it.
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"cost" or "value," except that the latter denotes intangible services
which are incapable of being priced.
In American News Co. v. FTC,5 s an inability to measure the cost
of prominently displaying national magazines perhaps accounted for
the Second Circuit's complete abandonment of the concept of cost,
with total reliance placed upon value."9 However, this case focused on
buyer exaction of excessive allowances from sellers. Thus, it could
be convincingly argued that the (value to) seller perspective was
adopted for the limited purpose of showing that the allowance was in
no event fair to the seller. The Commission's acceptance of seller
valuation in advisory opinions, now rescinded, may have been at-
tributable, at least in the past, to measurement uncertainties as well as
to its failure to directly address the problem.6"
A recent section 2(d) case, though not directly germane, never-
theless provides further support for the propriety of the cost standard.
Colonial Stores, Inc. v. FTC,6 involved allowances given to Colonial
by its suppliers to promote their products in a special promotional
booklet and to defray the costs of free promotional distribution of
some of the suppliers' products. The costs of both were probably cal-
culable. Finding a violation of section 2(d), the Fifth Circuit stated:
Some minimal effort to proportionalize in good faith must be
made, and while promotional benefits received may enter into
the calculation, they cannot obliterate entirely the fact that the
fundamental relationship is one of proportionality among offers.
To hold otherwise would result in widely varying promotional
payments in amounts almost directly related to the size and iner-
cantile prowess of the individual payee, a consequence which
§ 2(d) was enacted to preclude.62
While not expressly rejecting a suppliers' value basis, this passage
makes clear that benefits to the buyer were not to be predicated on
his size or power - a position which is consistent with the in-
stant premise.6"
It would seem then that the earlier cases suggest that a break-
down, as in Giant, or a nonexistence, as in General Foods, of cost
measurement criteria led to an elevation of the value method as an
appropriate alternative. Yet, the case with the clearest measurement,
58. 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
59. Id. at 109.
60. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
61. 450 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1971).
62. Id. at 743-44 (emphasis added; emphasis of the court omitted).
63. Since the case was primarily concerned with the unavailability of similar
offers to competitors, it might be argued that the court's remarks should be inter-
preted no further than to require that smaller buyers have the opportunity to receive
generally the same promotional payments as larger buyers.
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R.H. Macy, did not even mention "value" in passing. Nor has the
Commission hesitated to lay down a cost standard in promotional
areas in which concrete criteria have been available. The Trade Prac-
tice Rules for the Hosiery Industry (Hosiery Guides)" provide an
excellent example. These rules state, in pertinent part:
Note 1: Industry members giving allowances for advertis-
ing or sales promotion must ... exercise precaution and diligence
in seeing that all such allowances are used by the customers for
such purpose. Customers receiving such allowances must not use
same for any other purpose.
Note 2: When an industry member gives allowances to com-
peting customers for advertising in a newspaper or periodical, the
fact that a lower advertising rate for equivalent space is available
to one or more, but not all, such customers, is not to be regarded
by the industry member as warranting the retention by such
customer or customers of any portion of the allowance for his
or their personal use or benefit.65
Note 2 specifically covers one of the prime abuses indirectly visited
upon small buyers by virtue of large buyer power, and one of the
reasons a clearer cost standard might have been promulgated in 1972.
IV. COMMENTATORS
A number of commentators on this subject, many of them
attorneys in the private bar, favor a "value-to-seller" test when forced
to a choice. The reasoning behind their choices should be examined.
Ira Millstein, for example, advocates "at least a limited 'value received'
concept . . .not necessarily keyed to volume."6  He then uses media
advertising, ironically, the very abuse about which the Hoisery Guides
and Rowe's legislative history were so specific,67 as an instance where
he would like the "value received" standard to be used.
68
64. Trade Practice Rules for the Hosiery Industry, 16 C.F.R. §§ 152.1-.101
(1973). See 16 C.F.R. § 17.1(b) (1973).
65. 16 C.F.R. § 152.14(d) (1973) (emphasis added). Rowe's comments about
the Hosiery guides, which are strongly applicable to a cost test in general, are:
The Commission's requirements would inhibit collusive arrangements where-
by inflated promotional rate claims are submitted by distributors to a winking
supplier. Thus the supplier may be billed for advertising expenditures at higher
rates than the customer actually pays to the advertising medium - due to savings
by discounts or through local display rates lower than the national rate which
the supplier defrays.
F. RowE, supra note 16, at 410.
66. Millstein, Sections 2(d) and (e) Robinson-Patman Act - Compulsory
Universal Reciprocity?, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 77, 94 (1968) (emphasis added).
67. See notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
68. Millstein, supra note 66, at 94.
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Millstein's position can be understood best by viewing the genesis
of his thoughts. In a 1962 article 69 he proposed a "value received"
approach as a refinement of the more widely adopted "volume" ap-
proach, whereby a percentage discount per unit was allowed, regard-
less of seller's value, to purchasers who promoted in the prescribed
method. This latter method had led to seller overpayments which
were regarded as intolerable even to sellers. Hence, Millstein offered
the "value received" approach as a method by which sellers could
obtain their money's worth for promotional activities for which they
paid, and also suggested means by which the approach could be im-
plemented. Apparently, the reluctance at that time to use this method
was based on the relative difficulty of measurement. 70 Despite the
difficulties with overpayments, the per unit discount approach had
been favored because of its facile implementation. 7' Thus, in 1962
Millstein did not focus on a legal examination of the present proposi-
tion at all and in 1968 he did so only slightly;72 both times, he focused
more on the practicalities of his plan.
Frederick Rowe's advocacy of a "value-to-seller" test does not
flow smoothly from the argument he makes for it.7" On the one hand,
he notes that reimbursement for "actual cost outlays" would be in-
adequate because other distributor costs would be ignored. He then
jumps to the notion that all elements of promotional value must be
included to measure the worth to the supplier.74 There are perhaps
two arguments presented here: one, that value to the supplier is a
shorthand method of measuring cash outlay, plus any elusive "internal
costs"; the other, that since "worth to 'the supplier" is the main con-
cern, "value to the supplier," its natural synonym, is the logical
measuring stick to use. Under this latter approach, any discussion of
costs, (e.g., "internal costs"), appears unrequired.
The first argument fails by virtue of the experiential limits of
its truth. It is no doubt true that value may equal direct plus indirect
costs. But substantial quantity discounts are commonly found in
69. Millstein, supra note 4.
70. Id. at 894-95.
71. Id. at 889-96.
72. Millstein, supra note 66, at 93.
73. Specifically this commentator states:
[U]nless the disparity between the supplier's contribution and the value of
the promotion rendered by the distributor is fraudulent or grossly excessive, the
"fair and reasonable" standard of the Soap cases should apply. The worth to
the supplier of the distributor's promotional performance is not realistically
measurable solely by reference to the distributor's actual cash outlays to an
advertising medium, which would ignore the distributor's internal costs, but
derives from all elements of promotional value. Above all, value to the supplier,
not merely cost to the distributor, must be the crucial test.
F. RoWE, supra note 16, at 411 (emphasis supplied).
74. Id.
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advertising. Such discounted media compliance, when joined with
indirect costs, which must vary among customers, may only randomly
equal supplier's value.7 Another example of imprecise valuation is
the practice of sellers to inflate promotional value by "calculating" the
prestige which (prominent) buyers lend to advertising their product.
Even if objective measurement of this intangible could be accomplished,
it too might be found to be only casually related to seller's value.76
The second argument assumes that the primary intent of the
Robinson-Patman Act was to prevent the overpayment of advertising
allowances by sellers at the mercy of large buyers, in terms unfavor-
able to the sellers, i.e., in excess of the promotional value. This
assumption is neither fully supported nor elsewhere adopted by Rowe,
and this Article has attempted to demonstrate that this was not the
primary intent of section 2(d). It is contrary to the history of this
section to ignore the plight of smaller buyers, for whom a supplier's
value standard may still be discriminatory.
Another commentator, Paul Warnke, flatly states that:
[A] buyer in all likelihood may safely accept a promotional pay-
ment that more than compensates 'him for the cost of rendering
the service.77
He first notes that the Commission has approved the payment of
graduated allowances for graduated promotions, but then suggests
that a flat allowance for graduated promotions would probably never
be challenged. The reason given is that there is no prohibition against
permitting all customers to "earn the same overpayment." 8 Warnke
is accurate on this point if the supplier's allowance is then a pro
tanto across-the-board per unit price cut.79 If the promotion re-
quirements are nonexistent or evanescent, then such an allowance
75. Further, Rowe might argue that the operation of an advertising department,
which only large buyers would have, of course, is a "cost," which a broad "value-to-
supplier" standard best measures. But, even the cost of such departments must be
spread over the buyer's entire advertising output, some of which is unsubsidized.
Therefore, these indirect costs may, in fact, constitute only a nominal portion of the
total cost of any one advertisement for which the supplier compensates the purchaser.
76. This practice, needless to say, normally rewards only the largest buyers. Its
arbitrariness makes the "value" standard an empty gesture for maintaining "propor-
tionally equal terms" between buyers. Absent any measurement criteria, the discrimi-
nation inherent in the "value" approach may be cognizable under section 2(a). Cf.
Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd in part, 390 U.S. 341
(1968).
77. Warnke, Advertising and Promotional Allowances Under Federal Trade
Laws, in MANUAL OF FEDERAL TRADE REGULATION AFFECTING RETAILERS 25, 34
(J. Bliss & I. Millstein ed. 1963).
78. Id. at 33.
79. Or, at worst, such an allowance would constitute a cut which benefits small
buyers for whom a flat overpayment will constitute a greater per unit discount from
their smaller purchases. Query whether discrimination favoring smaller buyers
constitutes a violation of the Act.
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is not for promotion at all and must be viewed as a price cut.80 How-
ever, if the supplier imposes promotional requirements with which
even one buyer is unable to comply, although he would like to, then
the entire cost machinery must be wheeled into place.
Corwin Edwards, in a dispassionate analysis of this subject, ap-
proaches advertising allowances from two "rival conceptual views";
as a "concealed discount" and as "a price paid for a legitimate adver-
tising service."'" While he questions why the Commission, as of
1959, had not committed itself to one or the other direction, the
Commission, in fact, had addressed itself to section 2(d) from the
former standpoint. Even the Soap Cases are forthright in their position
that section 2(d) does not authorize a form of overpayment.8 2 Pay-
ment for any legitimate service would seem to have no place conceptu-
ally in a discussion of "overpayment."
Edwards' view of concealed discounts, however, begins at a level
"substantially in excess of the value of the service rendered." '8  Never-
theless, faced with the revised cost threshold, Edwards' analysis could
support the soundness of the "cost or approximate cost" position.
Speaking on a related matter - proportional equality in general
he states:
[T]he respondent under Section 2(d) cannot excuse his special
allowance by showing that it is justified by considerations of
economy or efficiency. 4
The disparity between cost and value is commonly related to such
economies or efficiencies as may be enjoyed by larger buyers. It is,
therefore, logical to suppose that if a supplier cannot absolutely select
one buyer in lieu of another because of economies, then similarly he
cannot relatively advantage one over the other.
85
80. Warnke's example tracked the promotions at issue in the Giant Food case
which required, among other things, only that the buyer continuously stock the
product for a specified period, without specifying any amount necessary. This is not a
true promotional requirement. Warnke, supra note 77, at 33-34.
81. C. EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 158. The gist of the latter view is that a
supplier could be oblivious to proportional equality if he simply procures advertising
through his customer, qua agent, much as he would procure a raw material. Id. at
158-59. The legislative history evidences recognition that this might occur and indi-
cates that any such advertising must in no way refer to the local business of the
buyer/agent selected. See 79 CONG. REc. 9079 (1935) (remarks of Representative
Patman) ; Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm. to Amend the Clayton Act,
74th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10, at 38-39 (1935) (statement of H.B. Teegarden). This
probably restricts the freedom of any such agent to advertise for his own benefit, even
secondarily, in connection with the supplier's product.
82. See, e.g., Lever Brothers Co., 50 F.T.C. 494, 511 (1953).
83. C. EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 159 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 164.
85. Cf. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION 99 (separate statement of Richard A. Posner) (1969). Posner would seek
modification of section 2(d) to permit allowances to be paid which are dispropor-
tionate due to varying customer efficiencies. Id.
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Even if the foregoing legal analysis be accepted, the proponents
of -the old value standard would still assert that the practical inability
to implement the new "cost or approximate cost" standard is reason
to preserve the value standard.8" One commentator, Harvey Apple-
baum, has stated that even "a team of CPA's" could not estimate the
costs of in-store displays or merchandising promotion for a substantial
variety of customers, including indirect retailers.8 7 The Grocery Manu-
facturers of America (GMA), representing a group of manufacturers
whose generic -name it bears, described numerous practical difficulties
in -their comments submitted to the Commission prior to implementa-
tion of the amended Guides. 8 They asserted generally that the added
burdens imposed by the changes would limit the ability of suppliers
to engage in allowance programs.89
The first substantive criticism presented by the GMA was that
some forms of promotion, such as in-store displays, do not lend them-
selves to cost analysis. Such analysis, the GMA stated, leads to figures
which "are not only irrelevant, but misleading, and . . . would lead to
inequitable results."9 Second, the GMA criticized the Commission
for offering no guidance as to the measurement of cost, questioning
specifically how labor and materials and rental space for a store display
should be calculated: Should rental space be included at all? Should
the allowance be based on the total area given to the display or just
for the increment over that area normally designated for the supplier's
product?1 Third, the GMA argued that even when calculable, such
figures can be the subject of "fraud and gross irregularities" since
they are so "highly subjective."92 Fourth, GMA submitted that cus-
tomers may not wish to provide "detailed cost information" to their
suppliers, as such data would not only be costly to compile, but also
might expose the customer to antitrust risks by providing the appear-
ance of collusion, and would make available to the supplier matter
86. See GMA Letter, supra note 23; Applebaum, supra note 12, at 364; Shnider-
man, Collateral Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act - Section 2(c),
(d) and (e), in 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 410, 418-20 (1960). In fact, Shnider-
man, offered no legal objection to the cost standards.
87. Applebaum, supra note 12, at 364. The indirect retailers were a group in-
cluded within the Act's protection as a direct result of the Fred Meyer decision. See
note 1 and accompanying text supra.
88. GMA Letter, supra note 23.
89. Id. at 2.
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which could "jeopardize the security of ... [the buyer's] confidential
business information.
'9 3
Fifth, the GMA believed that smaller retailers would be more
adversely affected than larger retailers, since the former take the
greatest advantage of in-store displays, for which cost is difficult to
calculate, while the latter utilize media promotional alternatives the
cost of which is presumably easier to calculate. 4 Since the programs
traditionally utilized by smaller retailers would be more difficult to
implement, the GMA suspected that manufacturers could not comply
with proportional equality and would, therefore, withdraw such pro-
grams entirely. 5
Sixth, regarding newspaper advertising rates, the GMA said that
"unreasonable and unworkable" burdens would be imposed on sellers
who, it was claimed, would be required to know both where the adver-
tisement was being placed and the line rate that the newspaper would
charge a specific buyer."6 The GMA asserted that paying retailers the
same amount for advertising in the same newspaper "is from the
manufacturer's viewpoint" as non-discriminatory as an offer could be.
The GMA further implied that if a seller were required to pay the
promoting buyer his "local rate," he could not give him additional
compensation for overhead costs." Finally, the GMA did not think
the manufacturer "should be held responsible ... because one customer
is capable of performing such services more eficiently or for a lower
cost than another.
'9 8
93. Id. at 3-5. The GMA Letter offered Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346
U.S. 61 (1953), as demonstrative of the legal risks involved in the sharing of a seller's
cost information with its buyer. GMA Letter, supra note 23, at 5. Reliance on this
case however, is misplaced. First, Automatic Canteen concerned buyer inducements
under Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Second, it involved seller's costs,
not buyer's promotional costs. The difference is crucial. Knowledge by a buyer of
the costs of various sellers would materially affect the ability of the latter to fairly
dispense their goods in competition with each other. Knowledge by a seller of his
buyer's promotional cost, e.g., how much he pays for labor, or for rental space per
square foot (if such be required), would not handicap the buyer in dealing with his
seller, since it bypasses critical information, such as buyer volume and profit, more
often used to measure competitive performance. In fact, under a "value to the seller"
approach, a proliferation of buyer volume figures has been necessitated by past plans.
See, e.g., FTC Administrative Opinion, Tripartite Promotional Assistance Plan, 16
C.F.R. § 15.367 (1973). Peripheral overhead information would seem to offer limited
insight into a buyer's operation. Cost figures might, in any event, be estimated or
be approximately calculable by reliance on third-party sources.
Automatic Canteen does demonstrate, however, that in the past the Com-
mission has required rigid proof of cost information in Robinson-Patman cases. 346
U.S. at 68 n.6. Hopefully, such rigidity will be left out of future section 2(d)
enforcement actions with respect to the measurement of "cost".
94. GMA Letter, supra note 23, at 4.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 4.
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In response to the GMA's complaints, it can be fairly stated that
they are directed more to the implementation of the changes than to
their legitimacy.99 The assertions that certain activities are difficult
to measure only demonstrates the usefulness that the "approximate
cost" alternative should have and the flexibility that, without question,
must be inherent In its use.1°° That inequity could be attached to a
cost basis for promotions is a certainty, but there was no showing by
GMA that inequity was in any way lacking under the "value" standard.
Second, the failure of the Commission to provide measurement
criteria is no greater than their failure to provide similar criteria for
the measurement of value in its early stages. It is the task of manu-
facturers and others to seek advisory opinions as they have in the past.
Hence, the GMA's concern about whether a calculation of rental space
cost should be made at all is itself a straw man. Surely, obvious meas-
urement criteria like rental cost for the space occupied by a given
display could not be opposed, provided, of course, that the rental cost
was determined by the worth of the building, not the worth of the
tenant. Sound accounting procedure allocates costs to the use of any
such space in a retail business and the Commission is not likely to turn
its back on requests to consider its objective inclusion as an element of
cost.
Third, to suggest that "fraud and gross inequities" could result
from a "subjective" determination of cost is to suggest apparently
that the manufacturer would have no hand in establishing objective
criteria for cost measurement and conducting checks to assure that
abuses are not occurring. It also assumes that approximate cost in-
formation might not be available from third-party sources. All of
these assumptions made by the GMA require empirical proof.
Fourth, the information which the buyer will need to make avail-
able to the seller may be substantially less extensive than the GMA
suspects. Of course, the seller will establish the criteria to be first
used. For a given display, for example, the seller might indicate that
it will occupy 7 square feet of space and 1 man-hour to assemble and
maintain. It is doubtful that much information would be required to
estimate the cost. The buyer would probably be disclosing little vital
information by reporting a figure calculated as a percentage of his
99. The letter does make a short legal argument, as well. Id. at 4-5.
100. Guide 11 suggests that the need for flexibility has already been anticipated.
It states that:
[W]hen customers may have different but closely related costs in furnishing
services that are difficult to determine, such as the cost for distributing coupons
from a bulletin board or using a window banner, the seller may furnish to each
customer the same payment if it has a reasonable relationship to the cost of
providing the service or is not grossly in excess thereof.
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rent plus overheard and a valuation of 1 hour of a clerk's or stock-
boy's time. Furthermore, information which could be deemed more
vital has been required by programs under the "value" standard in
the past. It is also doubtful that the disclosure by a buyer of bits and
pieces of his operating information would result in any antitrust law
vulnerability.' 01
Fifth, the GMA's claim that smaller retailers will be more ad-
versely affected than larger retailers is proved fallacious by GMA's
conclusion that promotional programs would have to end since "pro-
portional equality" could not be achieved. It is difficult to understand
how no program at all could do more harm to smaller than to larger
retailers.
1 2
While newspaper advertising rates would be difficult for a manu-
facturer to discern in every case, there is no suggestion in the amended
Guides that this be a requirement. To be relieved of liability, the
manufacturer is only required to take in good faith "reasonable and
prudent measures to verify the performance of his competing cus-
tomers.' 0 3 No "unreasonable and unworkable" burden could be fairly
read into a "reasonable and prudent" standard. However, the manu-
facturer would no doubt be required to spot check customers objec-
tively suspected to be the most likely beneficiaries of advertising
discounts.
As to the GMA's assertion that a cost standard might not allow
the payment of the overhead expenses associated with advertising, the
same might have been said of the predecessor value standards. Presum-
ably, buyers who received no media discount under the value theory
had no excess to devote to overheard at all. It seems particularly un-
fair, then, that some buyers might have had their overheard costs
defrayed while others did not. If a supplier chooses to cover his cus-
tomer's overhead expense, he can designate funds specifically for
that purpose.
The key to the GMA's analysis is that predictably it has looked at
the problem from a manufacturer's viewpoint. Their comments on
the amended Guides contained not a word detailing the relative dis-
advantages (or advantages) some smaller buyers received due to
promotional programs under the old value standard. It is possible that
a fair weighing of benefits and liabilities might favor their position;
however, the Commission has chosen to recognize the small buyer's
101. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
102. See text accompanying note 95 supra. It could be argued that even under
prior interpretation, smaller buyers were disfavored. For example, they would be
less likely to avail themselves of display allowances than larger buyers due to their
lack of space to accommodate such displays.
103. Guide 11.
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apparent plight perhaps, in part, because cogent argument disproving
that plight has been lacking."'0
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
The criticism presented by GMA at least justifies some explana-
tion of how the revised Guides are to be enforced. While there is no
way of guessing how vigorously the Guides will be enforced, the de-
crease in the numbers of Robinson-Patman Act complaints issued in
recent years'05 may provide some clue as to the extent of enforcement
to be expected under the new guidelines. Nevertheless, the mere fact that
the resources were expended to amend the Guides suggests that some
clarification of the law, by way of its enforcement, may be forthcoming.
The Commission appears firm in its resolve to conform its his-
torical record with the amended Guides as evidenced by its decision
in late 1973 to revoke 12 advisory opinions.10 6 But this act of rescis-
sion may create confusion in the minds of some counsel who advise
-their clients on these matters. If an entire advisory opinion is can-
celled, is it possible that each and every element in a once approved
plan now conflicts with the amended Guides? Probably not. With
respect to the newly adopted "cost or approximate cost" standards,
the offending sections in the previously accepted plans stand out
clearly. For example, one advisory opinion allowed a promotion in
the grocery field to make:
[p]ayments to stores . . . calculated in terms of the number of
ads installed, the rate per ad to vary with the monthly traffic in
the store, the minimum payments to be $4.25 per month per ad.'
It is apparent that this plan was defective both because varying the
payment according to traffic volume bears no relationship to cost, and
because a flat-rate payment is a direct reflection of value received,
but not necessarily of cost. If it could be demonstrated that the cost
of no advertisement was less than $4.25 for any customer, and that
the plan included some form of equalization to those paying in excess,
104. GMA, in its comments on the amended Guides, provided no information
negating a presumption of small buyer disadvantage. See GMA Letter, supra note 23.
105. According to this author's count, there were 58 consent orders and 29 com-
plaints issued under the Act in 1962. In 1963, these figures rose to 229 consent orders
and five complaints. In the years 1967 to 1973, the decline was more noteworthy: in
1967, seven consent orders and three complaints; in 1968, six consent orders and no
complaints; in 1972, one consent order and three complaints; and in 1973, one con-
sent order and no complaints. Hence, in a little over 10 years, the number of actions
initiated by the Commission under the Robinson-Patman Act dropped from 234 in
1963 to one in 1973.
106. 38 Fed. Reg. 28270, 28272, 28273, 28277 (1973).
107. FTC Administrative Opinion, Tripartite Promotional Plan in the Grocery
Field, 16 C.F.R. § 15.387(a) (1973).
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then this minimal payout would probably be unobjectionable.' How-
ever, in any event, traffic volume has no bearing on cost of performance.
A second example is presented by the Don Odessky case,'
wherein display areas for supplier promotion would be offered, "on
the basis of Y cent per display area for each person entering the store
each week."" ° The express purpose of this plan was to tie the pay-
ment to the traffic coming in to the store. The figure was measured
by requiring the customer to provide figures showing -the number of
sales made per week."' This figure too related not to cost, but to the
value of -the promotion to the supplier. The greater the exposure of
the display, the greater its value to the seller. Thus, the end of the
value standard has made presumptively illegal this method of repayment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The "approximate cost" substitution for "value" is apparently
designed ,to squeeze the excesses out of payments presently made to
buyers under the "value" test. It is not as rigid a measure as its
partner "cost." Rather, it is a recognition of the frequent difficulties
of measuring promotional efforts and the practicalities of obtaining
perfect information, especially related to indirect costs, both of which
have drawn the Commission and courts into numerous confusing de-
cisions. "Approximate cost" in some instances will prove to be identical
to value. As a matter of evidence, the value the seller places on a
108. One question that is unanswered by all the foregoing is whether "cost or
approximate cost" restrictions are applicable when less than the full advertising cost
is paid, i.e., when there is no overpayment, but a "value" basis is used. For example,
assume this improbable promotion is offered by a publisher to all its customers in
Boston. The publisher will pay 50 per cent of the going rate of $200 per month toward
the use of a billboard to promote a new book. This is the minimum requirement that
must be met for a customer to receive the allowance. If some recipients are depart-
ment stores who use billboards often and who receive 25 per cent discount off the
cost of each, those department stores will spend $50 for the promotional billboard,
while their bookstore counterparts must spend $100. Those who argue the "value"
approach might say that since there is no overpayment, -there is no violation. How-
ever, the economic chips have fallen in precisely the same places as before, namely,
the department stores have been favored to the tune of $50 due to the reduction in
the cost of the billboard. The Commission could hardly justify deducting the entire
discount from the payment, but it should require the publisher to form a plan which
reduces the payment to the department stores by $25, i.e., the half billboard discount
surplus effectively received by the department stores as overpayment for the half rental.
It could be argued that if one promotion would require different outlays by
two different buyers, then it is not "available on proportionally equal terms." See
Guide 7. If the higher costs to one buyer dictates his failure to act, then the plan
is, for practical purposes, simply not available to all, which would, of course, be a
violation. Guide 9. The legislative history of the Act speaks to this very point: it
viewed the availability standard in terms of comparative benefits, regarding plans
which lacked an equal opportunity to participate as "unjust". S. REP. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
109. FTC Administrative Opinion, Four Point Tripartite Promotional Advertis-
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program may accurately outline a nebulous blur of activities with some
costs to a buyer and may then be relied upon for measurement.
However, "approximate cost" differs in one major respect from
"value." The touchstone of the concept is buyers, not sellers. Only
where the difference between approximate cost and value is substan-
tial, will complaints be heard. At this point the Commission in its
amended Guides has made the policy decision -that it is more concerned
with. discriminatory effects against small business from excessive
payments to big business, than with the likelihood. of big business
exaction of payments in excess of their value to sellers. 112 Indeed,
adherence to the "cost or approximate cost". standard protects the
sellers, as well as the buyers, but the converse is not the case. 3
112. This was summed up well by one commentator:
Those whose interests lie with big business like to talk about ultimate value
of a given type of service to the seller .... The champions of small business think
only in terms of value to the buyer.
Fisher, Sections 2(D) and (E) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Revisited, 11
VAND..L. REV. 453, 468-69 n.50 (1958).113. The proponents of the value approach may still have hope. A former
Assistant Director of the Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition has
stated :
[W]e do not believe the additional burdens placed on suppliers, intermediaries or
newspapers will prove unreasonable. If the Guides do prove unworkable, after a
reasonable period of time they can be amended. We are not intractably intran-
sigent on this subject.
Address by Ernest G. Barnes to Grocery Manufacturers Association 11, Sept. 14,
1972 (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review).
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